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the prize court of the German Empire has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the fate of the Appam as la,vful 
prize. ~,he vessel 'vas in an .. A.merican port, and, under 
our practice, 'vithin the jurisdiction and possession of the 
district court, 'vhich had assumed to determine the 
alleged violation of neutral rights, 'vith power to dispose 
of the vessel accordingly. 'The foreign tribunal, under 
such circumstances, could not oust the jurisdiction of the 
local court and thereby defeat its judgment. (The 
Santissima Trinidad, supra, p. 355.) 
Were the rule otherwise than this court has frequently 
declared it to be, our ports might be filled, in case of a 
general war such as is now in progress bet,veen the 
European countries, with captured prizes of one or the 
other of the belligerents, in utter violation of the princi-
ples of neutral obligation 'vhich have controlled this 
country from the beginning. 
The violation of American neutrality is the basis of 
jurisdiction, and the admiralty courts may order restitu-
tion for a violation of such neutrality. In each case the 
jurisdiction and order rests upon the authority of the 
courts of the United States to make restitution to private 
owners for violations of neutrality 'vhere offending vessels 
are within our jurisdiction, thus vindicating our rights 
and obligations as a neutral people. 
It follo\\TS that the decree in each case must be affirmed. 
[1918] 
THE "HAKAN." 
[PRIVY CouNCIL.] 
ON APPEAL FROl\I THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND. 
October 16, 1917. 
{1918] A. C. 148. 
Appeal fron1 a judgment of the president of the pro-
hate, divorce, and admiralty division (in prize), deliv-
ered on July 3, 1916.55 
The appellants, a Swedish firm carrying on business 
at Gothenburg, were the owners of the steamship Hakan, 
which was condemned by a judgment of the president 
(Sir Samuel Evans) on the ground that she was 
captured while carrying a contraband cargo. 
The facts appear from the judgment of their lordships. 
li5 (1916] p. 266. 
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'fhe learned president held that, apart from the pro-
visions of article 40 of the declaration of London, 1909, 
the action and the views expressed by the chief maritime 
States before and since the international naval conference 
of 1908-9 justified the prize court in accepting as part 
of the law of nations the rule, stated in article 40, that 
' 'a vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the 
contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, 
or freight, forms more than half the cargo." He con-
sidered that \vhere the contraband being carried ex-
ceeded the above stated proportion it w:as not necessary 
to prove knowledge on the part of the owner or master 1 
that the goods in question \Vere destined for the enemy. 
He held that the owner, or the 1naster on his behalf, must 
,. be taken to know the nature a.nd destination of the cargo. 
Upon the facts of the present case, ho·w·ever, he found 
that the ship having been chartered at a freight represent-
ing 200 per cent per annum upon her capital or insurable 
value there could be no doubt that the o'\vners knew 
that she "'as to be employed in the contraband trade 
between Scandinavia and German Baltic ports. The 
Hakan accordingly was condemned. 
October 16. The judgment of their lordships was Statement oflho 
r.ase. 
delivered by Lord Parker, of Waddington. The Swedish 
steamship Hak·an, the subject of this appeal, '\vas cap-
tured at sea by H. M. S. Nonsuch on April 4, 1916, having 
sailed the same day from Haugesund, in N or1vay, on a 
voyage to Lubeck, in Germany, with a cargo of salted 
herrings. Foodstuffs had as early as August 4, 1914, 
been declared to be conditional contraband. The writ 
in the present proceedings claimed condemnation of both 
ship and cargo, the former on the ground that it \Vas 
carrying contraband goods and the latter on the ground 
that it consisted of contraband goods. 
It should be observed that the cargo, being on a neutral 
ship, '\vas, even if it belonged to enemies, exempt from 
capture unless it consisted of contraband goods (see the 
declaration of Paris) . 
The cargo o"~ners did not appear or make any claim in 
the action, although, according to the usual practice of 
the prize court, even enemies may appear and be heard 
in defense of their rights under an international agree-
ment. The question \vhether the goods \Yere contraband 
\Yas, ho"rever, fully argued by counsel for the O\vners of 
the ship, a Svvedish firm carrying on business at Gothen-
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burg. The president condemned the cargo as contra-
band. I-Ie also condemned the ship for carrying con-
traband. 'fhc o\vners of theship have now appealed to 
liis Majesty in council. Under these circumstances the 
first question to be decided is ·w·hether the cargo was rightly 
condemned as contraband, for if it was not there could 
be no case against the ship. 
co~t~~b~~~~ onal In their lordships' opinion, goods which are conditional 
contraband can be properly condemned \vhenever the 
court is of opinion, under all the circumstances brought 
to its knowledge, that they were probably intended to be 
applied for warlike purposes, the J onge Margaretha. 56 
Presumptio? of The fact alone that the O"Oods in question are on the wav enemy destma- o ... 
'ion. to an enemy base of naval or military equipment or 
supply \vould justify an inference as to their probable 
application for warlike purposes. But the character of 
the place of destination is not the only circumstance 
from which this inference can be drawn. All the known 
facts have to be taken into account. The fact that the 
goods are consigned to the enemy government, and not 
to a private individual, \vould be material. The. 
same would be the case if, though the goods are con-
signed to a private individual, such individual is in sub-
stance or in fact the agent or representative of the 
enemy government. 
In the present case Lubeck, the port of destination of 
the goods, is undoubtedly a port used largely for the 
importation into Germany of goods from Nor\vay and 
Sweden; but it does not appear whether it is used 
exclusively or at all as a base of naval or military equip-
ment. On the other hand, it is quite certain that the 
persons to \vhom the goods ,.vere consigned at Lubeck 
were bound forthwith to hand them over to the Central 
Purchasing Co., of Berlin, a company appointed by the 
German Government to act under the direction of the 
imperial chancellor for purposes connected \vith the con-
trol of the food supplies rendered necessary by the \var. 
The proper inference seems to be that the goods in 
question are in effect goods requisitioned by the Govern-
ment for the purposes of the \Var. It may be quite true 
that their ultimate application, had they escaped capture, 
\Vould have been to feed civilians, and not the naval or 
military forces of Ger1nany; but the general scarcity of 
food in Germany had 1nade the victualing of the civil 
s&l C. Rob. 189. 
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population a 'var problem. Even if the military or naval 
forces of Ger1nany are never supplied with salted herrings, 
their rations of bread or meat may 'vell be increased by 
reason of the possibility of supplJing sal ted herrings to 
the civil population. Underj~these circumstances, the 
inference is almost irresistible that the goods 'vere 
intended to be applied for warlike purposes, and, this 
being so, their lordships are of opinion that the goods 
were rightly condemned. 
The second question their lordships have to determine 
relates to the condemnation of the ship for c~rrying the 
goods in question. It is, of course, quite clear that if . 
article 40 of the declaration of London 57 be applicable, L~~~~~atlOn ot 
the ship was rightly condemned, inasmuch as the whole 
cargo was contraband. The declaration of London has, 
however, no validity as an international agreement. It 
was, it is true, provided by the order in council of Octo-: 
her 29, 1914, that during the present hostilities its pro-
visions should, with certain very material modifications, 
be adopted and put in force. But the prize court can 
not, in deciding questions bet,veen His Majesty's Gov-
ernment and neutrals, act upon this order except in so 
far as the declaration of London, as modified by the 
order, either embodies the international law or contains 
a waiver in favor o(~neutrals of the strict rights of the 
Crown. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the inter-
national law with regard to the condemnation of a ship 
for carrying contraband apart from the declaration of 
London. 
' It seems quite~clear that at one time in our history the 
mere fact thati a neutral ship was carrying contraband 
was considered to justify its condemnation, but this rule stowell's opin-
was subsequently modified. Lord Stowell deals with the ion. 
matter in the Neu-tralitet: 58 ''The modern rule of the law 
of nations is, certainly," he says, ''that the ship shall not 
be subject to condemnation for carrying contraband arti-
cles. The ancient practice was otherw·ise; and it can not 
be denied, that it was perfectly defensible on every prin-
ciple of justice. If to supply the enemy 'vith such articles 
is a noxious act with respect to the O"\Vner of the cargo, 
the vehicle which is instrumental in effecting that illegal 
purpose can not be innocent. The policy of modern t imes 
----------- --
67 Art. 40: "A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband, 
reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or f~·eight, forms more than half the cargo." 
~ (1801) 3 C. Rob. 295. 
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has, however, introduced a relaxation on this point; and 
the general rule now is, that the vessel does not become 
confiscable for that act. But this rule is liable to excep-
tions-where a ship belongs to the ow·ner of the cargo, 
or where the ship is going on such service, under a false 
destination or false papers; these circumstances of aggra-
vation have been held to constitute excepted cases out 
of the n1odern rule, and to continue them under the 
ancient one.'' 
It is to be observed that Lord Sto'-""ell does not say 
that the particular cases he refers to are the only excep-
tions to the modern rule. On the contrary, his actual 
decision in the Neutralitet 59 creates a third exception. It 
should be observed, too, that in a later part of his judg-
ment he states the reason for the modification of the 
ancient rule to be the supposition that noxious or doubt-
ful articles might be carried 'vithout the personal kno,vl-
edge of the owner of the ship. l-Ie held in the case before 
him that this ground for the n1odification of the rule 
entirely failed, so that the ancient rule applied. The 
reasoning is sound. For if the ancient rule 'vas modified 
because of the possible 'vant of kno,vledge on the part of 
the shipo,vner, it is perfectly logical to treat actual kno,vl-
edge on the part of the shipo,vner as a good ground for 
excepting any particular case fro1n the modern rule. 
Knowledge 'viii also explain the t'vo 1nain exceptions to 
which Lord Stowell refers. If the shipuwner also o'vns 
the contraband cargo, he must have this knowledge; 
and if he sails under a false destination or with false 
papers, it is quite legitnnate to infer this knowledge 
from his conduct. In his earlier decision in the Ring-
ende Jacob 60 Lord Sto,vell had stated the modern rule 
to be that the carrying of contraband is attended 
only with loss of freight and expenses, except where 
the ship belongs to the o'vner of the contraba.nd cargo 
or 'vhere the simple misconduct of carrying a con-
traband cargo has been connected with other malignant 
and aggravating circumstances. If by malignant and 
aggravating circumstances Lord Sto,vell 1neant only cir-
cumstances from 'vhich kno,vledge of the character of the 
ca.rgo 1night be properly inferred, the rule thus stated 
does not differ from that laid do,vn in the subsequent 
case of the Neutralitet.59 But the 'vords used have by 
li9 3 C. Rob. 295. GO (1798) 1 C. Rob. 89. 
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son1e '\Vriters been taken as indicating that, in Lord Sto"r-
ell's opinion, besides knowledge of the character of the 
cargo, there must be on the part of the shipo'\vner some 
intention or conduct to \vhich the epithets "malignant 
or aggravating" can be applied in a real as opposed to a 
rhetorical sense. Any such hypothesis seen1s, however, 
to vitiate the reasoning of Lord Stowell in the Neutrali-
tet.59 Sailing under a false destination or false papers 
may possibly be called malignant or aggravating. There 
is not only the knowledge of guilt, but an attempt to 
evade its consequences. But in the case of the shipowner 
who also owns the contraband on board his ship it is 
difficult to see \vhere the malignancy or aggravation lies, 
if it be not in the knowledge of the character of the goods 
on board. If it be malignant or aggravating on the part 
of the owner of the goods to consign them to the enemy, 
it must be equally malignant and aggravating on the part 
of the shipowner knowingly to aid in the transaction. 
Nevertheless, it was this construction of Lord Stowell's 
words in the Ringende Jacob 61 rather than the reasoning 
on which his decision in the Neutralitet 62 case was based 
that was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of the Bermuda.63 In that case Chase, Chase'sopinion. 
C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, says as to 
the relaxation of the ancient rule: "It is founded on the 
presumption that the contraband shipment was made 
without the consent of the owner given in fraud of 
belligerent rights, or, at least, without intent on his 
part to take hostile part against the country of the 
captors; and it must be recognized and enforced in all 
cases \vhere that presumtion is not repelled by proof. 
The rule, however, requires good faith on the part of the 
neutral, and does not protect the ship where good faith 
is \Vanting. * * * Mere consent to transportation 
of contraband will not always or usually be taken to be a 
violation of good faith. There must be circumstances 
of aggravation. The nature of the contraband articles 
and their importance to the belligerent, and the general 
features of the transaction, must be taken into considera-
tion in determining whether the neutral owner intended 
or did not intend, by consenting to the transportation, 
to mix in the war.'' 
e11 C. Rob. 89. 62 3 c. Rob. 295. csa {1865) 3 \ValJ. 514, 555. 
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Passing from the English and American decisions to 
the views which were at the commencement of the present 
hostilities entertained by the prize courts or jurists of 
other nations, we find what at first sight appears to be 
considerable divergence of opinion. If, however, the 
t rue principle be that kno,vledge of the character of the 
cargo is a sufficient ground for depriving a shipowner of 
the benefit of the modern rule, this divergence is more 
apparent than real. It reduces itself to a difference of 
opinion as to the cirdumstances under which the knowl-
edge may be inferred, and if it be remembered that 
knowledge on the part of the shipowner of the character 
of the cargo must be largely a matter of inference from a 
great variety of circumstances, such difference of opinion 
is readily intelligible. 
Referring, for example, to the vie'v entertained in 
Holland, their lordships find that, although the ship is 
prima facie confiscable if an important part of the 
cargo be contraband, proof that the master or the char-
terers could not have known the real nature of the cargo 
'vill secure the ship's release. In other words, the pro-
portion of the contraband to the whole cargo raises a 
presumption of kno,vledge which may be rebutted . 
... ~gain, according to the vie,vs held in Italy, the ship 
carrying contraband is liable to confiscation only 'vhere 
the owner was a 'vare that his vessel was in tended to be 
used for the carrying of contraband. Here knowledge 
is made the determining factor, the manner in which 
knowledge is to be proved or inferred being left to the 
general law. Again, according to the views entertained 
in Germany, a ship carrying contraband can only be 
confiscated if the o'vner or the charterer of the 'vhole 
ship or the master kne'v or ought to have known that 
there was contraband on board, and if that contraband 
formed more than a quarter of the cargo. Here also 
knowledge is made the determining factor, though there 
is a concession to the neutral if the proportion of the 
contraband to the whole cargo be sufficiently small. 
Once more, in France the test of the right to confiscate 
is whether or not the contraband is three-fourths in 
value of the 'vhole cargo. This view may be looked on 
as defining the circumstances in which an irrebuttable 
inference of kno,vledge arises. The views entertained in 
Russia and Japan are similarly explicable. In their 
lordships' opinion the principle underlying all these 
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views is the same. There can be no confiscation of the 
ship without knowledge on the part of the owner, or 
possibly of the charterer or master, of the nature of the 
cargo, but in some cases the inference as to knowledge 
arising from the extent to which the cargo is contraband 
can not be rebutted, while in others it can, and in some 
cases, even where there is the requisite knowledge, the 
contraband must bear a minimum proportion to the 
whole cargo. 
It follows that the views entertained by foreign nations 
point to knowledge of the character of the goods being 
alone sufficient for condemnation of a vessel for carrying 
contraband; in other words, they support the principle 
to be derived from the reasoning in the Neutralitet 14 
rather than the principle which has been deduced from 
the dictum in the Ringende Jacob 65 and developed in 
the Bermuda.M It should be observed that both West-
lake and Hall agree that knowledge is alone sufficient to 
justi.fy confiscation. (See Westlake, International Law 
(War), 2d ed., p. 291; Hall, International La,v, 6th ed., 
p. 666.) 
Their lordships consider that in this state of the au-
thorities they ought to hold thnt knowledge of the 
character of the goods on the part of the owner of the 
ship is sufficient to justify the condemnation of the ship-
at any rate, 'vhere the goods in question constitute a 
substantial part of the whole cargo. 
In the light of what has been said as to the rule of Facts or case. 
international law their lordships will now proceed to con-
sider the special facts of this case. The o\vners of the 
ship are a Swedish firm carrying on business at Gothen-
burg. On January 8, 1916, they chartered the ship to 
a German firm of fish dealers for u period of six 'veeks 
from the time when the vessel 'vas placed at charterers' 
disposal, "'~ith power for the charterers to prolong this 
period up to May 16, 1916. The voyages undertaken by 
the charterers 'vere to be from Scandinavian to German 
Baltic ports. It must have been quite evident to the 
owners that the ship 'vould be used for the importation 
of fish into Germany. 1"'hey must also have known that 
foodstuffs \Vere conditional contraband. It is almost 
inconceivable that they did not also kno\v of the food 
64 3 C. Rob. 295. 
59650-24-12 
G5 1 C. Rob·. 89. &e 3 'Vall. 514. 
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difficulties in Germany and of the manner in \Vhich the 
German Government had in effect requisitioned salted 
herrings to meet the exigencies of the \var. They 
had an opportunity in the court below· of establishing 
their \vant of kno,vledge if it existed, but they did not 
attempt to do so. The inference that they did in fact 
lmo'v that the vessel 'vould be used for the purpose 
for 'vhich it 'vas used is irresistible. If kno\vledge of the 
character of the goods be the true criterion as to confisca-
bility, the vessel 'vas rightly condemned. 
Even on the hypothesis that something beyond mere 
kno,vledge of the character of the ca.rgo is required, some-
thing 'vhich may be called "malignant or aggravating" 
'vi thin the principles of the Ringende rl acob 67 or the 
Ber·muda 68 decisions, that something clearly exists in 
the present case. A shipo,vner who lets his ship on time 
charter to an enemy dealer in conditional contraband for 
the purposes of his trade at a. time 'vhen the conditional 
contraband is vitally necessary to and has been reqpisi-
tioned by the enemy government for the purpose of the 
'\\rar is, in their lordships' opinion, deliberately ''taking 
hostile part against the country of the captors" and 
"mixing in the 'V~tr" 'vi thin the meaning of those ex-
pressions as used by Chase C. J. in the Bermuda. 68 
In their lordships' opinion, the appeal fails and should 
be dismissed 'vi th costs. 
THE "BONNA." 
ADMIRALTY. 
(IN PRIZE.) 
February 14, 15, 19, 1918. 
[1918] p. 123. 
In this case, " rhich governed a nu1nber of others, the 
procurator general, on behalf of the Cro\vn, claimed the 
condemnation of 416 tons of coconut oil seized at Bristol 
on August 27, 1916, ex the Nor\vegian steamship Bonna. 
The claimants, the Nya Margarin A/B. Svea, of Kaln1ar, 
S\veden, claimed the release of the oil on the ground that 
it had been bought by them for the purpose of the manu-
facture, in their own factory, of 1na.rgarine for sale and 
consumptjon in S\veden. 
6i 1 C. Rob. 89. 68 3 'Vall. 514. 
